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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
PROVO CITY, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
BRADLEY SPOTTS, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 920202 CA 
Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Jurisdiction authority is conferred upon the Utah Court of 
Appeals pursuant to §78-2a-3(2)(d), Utah Code Annotated (1953, as 
amended). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Was SPOTTS legally seized? 
2. Did the trial court err in admitting statements made by 
SPOTTS? 
3. Was the evidence sufficient to support the trial court's 
finding of guilty? 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, RULES, ETC. 
Constitution of the United States, Amendment IV. 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported 
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized. 
Utah Code Annotated, §58-37-8(2)(a)(i), adopted by Provo City 
Ordinances as Ordinance No. 9/58-37-8(2)(a)(i). 
It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally 
to possess or use a controlled substance, unless it was 
obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly 
from a practitioner while acting in the course of his 
professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this 
sub-section. 
Utah Code Annotated, §7 6-1-501. Presumption of innocence - "Element 
of the offense11 defined. 
(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to 
be innocent until each element of the offense charged 
against him is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In 
absence of such proof, the defendant shall be acquitted. 
Utah Code Annotated, §77-7-15. Authority of Peace Officer to Stop 
and Question Suspects - Grounds. 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place 
when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has 
committed or is in the act of committing or is attempting 
to commit a public offense and may demand his name, 
address, and an explanation of his actions. 
Utah Code Annotated, §77-17-3. Discharge for insufficient evidence. 
When it appears to the court that there is not 
sufficient evidence to put the defendant to his defense, 
it shall forthwith order him discharged. 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 30. Errors and defects. 
(a) Any error, defect, irregularity or variance 
which does not affect the substantial rights of a party 
shall be disregarded. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
SPOTTS was charged by Information dated October 1, 1991, 
alleging a violation date of September 28, 1991. SPOTTS was 
charged with possession of a controlled substance, to wit: 
Marijuana. (Although the Information charges SPOTTS with a 
violation of Provo City Ordinance 9/58-37-8(1)(a)(ii), the citation 
to the section in the Information was in error, as it was clear 
that the City's theory of the case and the evidence submitted went 
only to the crime of simple possession and not to distribution.) 
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SPOTTS appeared pro se before the court on November 20, 1991, 
and requested court-appointed counsel. The court granted the 
motion retaining the original trial setting of December 9, 1991, 
and giving notice of appointment of counsel to Thomas H. Means on 
November 26, 1991. At the time set for trial, Mr. Means advised 
the court that he wished to move to suppress evidence gained as a 
result of the stop of SPOTTS1 automobile. The City did not object 
and the court allowed that the motion could be reserved and that 
hearing on the motion and trial would proceed simultaneously. 
Evidence was heard by the court without a jury. SPOTTS1 
motion to suppress evidence and statements derived after the stop 
of his vehicle was denied as was his motion for dismissal after the 
City had rested its case. The court entered a verdict of guilty to 
possession of marijuana. Final judgment was entered upon the 
verdict on February 4, 1992. SPOTTS filed a Notice of Appeal on 
February 14, 1992. The trial court thereafter granted SPOTTS1 
motion for a certificate of probable cause on March 24, 1992. 
STATEMENT OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Honorable Lynn W. 
Davis, Circuit Court Judge, Fourth Circuit Court, Provo City 
Department, State of Utah, rendered on February 4, 1992, upon a 
verdict that SPOTTS was guilty of possessing marijuana after trial 
on December 9, 1991. SPOTTS appeals from such judgment and 
specifically from the trial court's denial of his motion to 
suppress evidence and statements derived after he was seized by an 
officer of the Provo City Police Department. 
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STATEMENT OP THE PACTS 
(All references are to pages of the Trial Transcript, i.e., TT. 3) 
The facts of this case are brief and essentially undisputed by 
the parties. A reading of the transcript of the testimony of the 
arresting officer found on pages 3 through 18 of the trial 
transcript as well as the testimony of SPOTTS found on pages 31 
through 34 of the trial transcript will give a complete overview of 
the facts. To comply with Rule 24(a)(7) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, SPOTTS nevertheless sets forth the facts as 
follows: 
On September 28, 1991, Officer Ingrid Weinmuller, a Provo City 
police officer, was on a traffic control assignment after a BYU 
football game. At about 3:30 p.m., she was parked facing east at 
5600 North University Avenue inside the Eagle Systems1 business 
parking lot. She was in her police uniform but in her private, 
unmarked vehicle. The game had not yet ended and she was waiting 
for traffic to pick up (TT. 4-5) . 
A red truck pulled into the parking lot and stopped facing 
northbound directly in front of her vehicle at a distance of 
approximately ten (10) feet. Weinmuller was able to clearly see 
into the cab of the truck and observed two (2) white males. She 
identified SPOTTS as the driver. She noticed that SPOTTS "had a 
small, rolled up what appeared to be a joint in his hand and he 
took some hits off of it" (TT. 5-6). 
She described the "joint" as "smaller than a cigarette and it 
was probably one-half (h) inch long, and he smoked it, it—burned 
rapidly. I could see the orange, as he was inhaling, rapidly 
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disintegrate, not as a cigarette would." She testified that she 
was familiar with what a marijuana joint looked like because of 
seeing other friends use it in high school and from her experience 
at the POST Academy training (TT. 6). 
SPOTTS started to drive away and proceeded about ten (10) feet 
when Weinmuller stepped out of her private vehicle and signalled 
for him to stop his truck. She remembered that his windows were 
shut, that it was a warm day and that it was daylight. As SPOTTS 
stopped, he opened the driver's door and Weinmuller could 
immediately smell an odor that she associated with burning 
marijuana. She testified that she smelled the smoke from a 
distance of about three (3) feet as SPOTTS opened the door and 
exhaled (TT. 7-8). 
Weinmuller asked SPOTTS to get out of the truck so she could 
ask him about the "joint." She noticed his speech was "real slow." 
She also had him perform the Gaze-Nystagmus. She testified that 
his eyes appeared bloodshot and that she could still smell a strong 
odor of marijuana on his person and on his breath. She called for 
backup and also asked SPOTTS for consent to search his vehicle. 
SPOTTS consented. Weinmuller found no evidence in the search. She 
testified that SPOTTS had not been out of her sight (TT. 8-9). 
In response to the question from the prosecutor, "Do you know 
what happened to that item that you saw him smoke?", Weinmuller 
responded, "I asked him what had happened to it. He said he gave 
it to his friend." Weinmuller testified that the other passenger 
had exited the truck and walked away when the truck first pulled 
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perpendicularly in front of her vehicle early in the incident. 
Upon further direct examination by the prosecution, Weinmuller 
stated, "I was asking where the cigarette was, where the marijuana 
cigarette was—." "He said he gave it to his friend." "I asked 
him what he did with it, he said he gave it back to his friend as 
he exited the vehicle. I asked him how many hits he had had off of 
it, he said a few. I told him that it was illegal to possess 
marijuana and to operate a vehicle while impaired by marijuana, and 
he said, 'Do you think I would be driving it if it was going to 
effect my driving?'" Weinmuller then arrested SPOTTS for 
possession of marijuana (TT. 10-11). 
On cross-examination, Weinmuller clarified that she questioned 
SPOTTS and conducted the Gaze-Nystagmus test while SPOTTS stood 
outside of his vehicle prior to the arrest. No blood was drawn 
from SPOTTS to determine the existence of marijuana or marijuana 
derivatives in his system. She testified she understood that the 
Gaze-Nystagmus test was intended to indicate whether a person's 
central nervous system is affected by alcohol or drugs but that she 
was not aware if other factors, such as illness, stress, or other 
irritants, could also affect a person's response to the Gaze-
Nystagmus test (TT. 12-13). 
Concerning stopping SPOTTS, Weinmuller testified that "I asked 
him to—I motioned for him to stop," that it was her intent for him 
to stop, and that she asked him to stop based upon what she had 
observed him doing. She testified that while she observed him 
smoking what she believed to be marijuana, she was unable to smell 
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it prior to the stop. She admitted that tobacco could also be 
smoked in the same manner and that she didn't know whether tobacco 
would have burned in any way significantly different from 
marijuana. She also admitted that the manner in which the 
cigarette burned could be more a factor of the way in which it was 
rolled as opposed to the substance that was inside it (TT. 14-15). 
On redirect examination by the prosecution, Weinmuller 
testified that she had never seen a hand-rolled tobacco cigarette 
and that while it was her experience that hand-rolled marijuana 
cigarettes burned faster [than commercial cigarettes], she did not 
know whether marijuana burned faster than tobacco. She reiterated 
that she first smelled the odor of marijuana after SPOTTS' car had 
been stopped and he opened the door (TT. 16). 
On recross-examination, Weinmuller testified that she stopped 
SPOTTS1 truck before she smelled any odors and on the strength of 
having seen SPOTTS smoking something that was rolled up and burning 
rapidly. She testified that she saw nothing that would help her 
articulate the difference between burning tobacco and burning 
marijuana. When asked to differentiate between the smell of 
burning marijuana and the smell of burning tobacco, she 
characterized burning marijuana as "sharp," "shocking," arid 
"offensive." She also pointed to the characteristics of SPOTTS1 
speech as well as his bloodshot eyes as indicators that the 
substance was marijuana (TT. 17-18). 
SPOTTS was called to testify for the limited purpose of his 
Motion to Suppress. He testified that he could see that Weinmuller 
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was uniformed and he stopped because "she got out and said, 'Hold 
it1 or something, I didn't quite understand her. I said, 'Excuse 
me, what did you say?' She said, 'Pull over, I want to talk to 
you.'" When asked if he felt whether he was free to go, he 
responded, "Oh, by no means." He testified that he felt like he 
was not free to go because Weinmuller was outside of her car, she 
had her hand up, he recognized that she was in a Provo City police 
uniform, and she motioned and verbalized something. He testified 
that he would not have stopped had she not motioned and verbalized 
as she had (TT. 33-34). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
SPOTTS' truck was stopped and he was therefor seized, without 
a reasonable and articulable suspicion that he had committed, was 
committing, or was about to commit a crime. 
POINT II 
The trial court erroneously admitted SPOTTS• pre-arrest 
statements, notwithstanding that the City had failed to 
independently establish a corpus delicti. 
POINT III 
The evidence admitted at trial was insufficient to establish 
the identity of the substance possessed by SPOTTS beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
8 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SPOTTS1 TRUCK WAS STOPPED AND HE WAS THEREFOR SEIZED, WITHOUT A 
REASONABLE AND ARTICULABLE SUSPICION THAT HE HAD COMMITTED, WAS 
COMMITTING, OR WAS ABOUT TO COMMIT A CRIME. 
The Standard of Review. 
In State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Ut. 1991), n. #3, the Utah 
Supreme Court clarified that threshold constitutional questions are 
reviewed in a bifurcated manner. The subsidiary and factual 
determinations are reviewed by a clearly erroneous standard while 
the ultimate determination of admissibility is a question of law 
reviewed under a correctness standard. This Court has applied the 
same bifurcated approach to appeals concerning motions to suppress. 
See State v. Taylor, 818 P.2d 561 (Ut. App. 1991); State v. Lopez, 
186 UAR 17 (Ut. App. 1992); and State v. Parker, 189 UAR 3 (Ut. 
App. 1992). 
The first question in determining whether SPOTTS was legally 
seized necessarily involves determining whether or not he was, in 
fact, seized. "[A] person has been 'seized1 within the meaning of 
the Fourth Amendment if, in view of all of the circumstances 
surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed 
that he was not free to leave." United States v. Mendenhall, 446 
U.S. 544 (1980) and Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983). "The 
test for when the seizure occurred is objective and depends on when 
the person reasonably feels detained, not on when the police 
officer thinks the person is no longer free to leave." State v. 
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Ramirez. supra. A seizure occurs "when a reasonable person, based 
on the totality of the circumstances, remains, not in the spirit of 
cooperation with the officer's investigation, but because he 
believes he is not free to leave." State v. Truiillo, 739 P. 2d 85 
(Ut. App. 1987); State v. Menke, 797 P.2d 537 (Ut. App. 1990); 
State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761 (Ut. App. 1991); State v. Hargraves, 
806 P.2d 228 (Ut. App. 1991); State v. Carter, 812 P.2d 460 (Ut. 
App. 1991); State v. Cornwall, 810 P.2d 484 (Ut. App. 1991); State 
v. Davis. 821 P.2d 9 (Ut. App. 1991); and State v. Leonard, 825 
P.2d 664 (Ut. App. 1991). 
"The stopping of an automobile and the consequent detention of 
its occupants constitutes a "seizure1 within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment despite the fact that the purpose of the stop is 
limited and the resulting detention quite brief." Delaware v. 
Prowse. 440 U.S. 649 (1979); State v. Cole, 674 P.2d 119 (Ut. 
1983); State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Ut. App. 1988); United States 
v. Guzman. 864 F.2d 1512 (10th Cir. 1988); State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 
879 (Ut. App. 1989); United States v. Walker, 933 F.2d 812 (10th 
Cir. 1991); State v. Figueroa-Solorio, 183 UAR 42 (Ut. App. 1992); 
State v. Lovearen. 183 UAR 81 (Ut. App. 1992) ; State v. Lopez, 
supra; and State v. Parker, supra. On the foregoing authority, 
SPOTTS was seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment of the 
Constitution of the United States, if the automobile he was driving 
was stopped by the officer and/or he was objectively reasonable in 
his belief that he was not free to go. 
10 
The evidence is undisputed that SPOTTS originally stopped 
voluntarily, although his timing was not good (TT. 5, 33). 
However, after initially stopping on his own to let his passenger 
out, and without turning off his motor, SPOTTS then attempted to 
proceed (TT. 33). On his attempt to proceed, Officer Weinmuller 
signaled for him to pull over by getting out of her vehicle, 
motioning with her arm, and verbalizing something (TT. 7, 14, 33, 
and 34) . Weinmuller took the actions that she did because she 
intended that SPOTTS stop his truck (TT. 14) . Likewise, SPOTTS 
perceived that Weinmuller wanted him to stop his truck (TT. 33 and 
34). More important, any reasonable person in SPOTTS1 position 
would have concluded that he or she was not free to continue to 
drive away based upon the following objective factors: As SPOTTS1 
truck started to proceed, a uniformed Provo City police officer 
stepped out of her vehicle, roughly in line with SPOTTS' direction 
of travel, or immediately adjacent thereto, raised her hand, 
motioned for him to stop and verbalized for him to stop. Although 
no lights or sirens were used, the conditions were such that SPOTTS 
could clearly see the actions of the officer and could hear enough 
of what she was saying to understand her expressed intent that he 
stop his car. 
This incident is not typical of traffic stops, but from the 
totality of the circumstances, it is clear that SPOTTS was stopped 
by a uniformed police officer whom he reasonably perceived did not 
want him to go further. SPOTTS reasonably believed that he was not 
free to go and was, therefore, seized. 
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"Under Terry, the determination of whether a seizure is 
reasonable involves a two-prong test: (1) Was the officer's action 
justified at its inception?, and (2) was his action reasonably 
related in scope to the circumstances which justified the 
interference in the first place?" United States v. Terry, 392 U.S. 
1 (1968); State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431 (Ut. App. 1990); and 
State v. Parker, supra. SPOTTS challenges his seizure under the 
first prong of the Terry test, claiming that his stop was 
unjustified in its inception. SPOTTS further claims that because 
the stop was not initially justifiable, all evidence derived as a 
result of the stop was tainted and should have been suppressed by 
the trial court. 
If a seizure occurs and the police are unable to point to 
the specific and articulable facts that justified that 
seizure, the seizure violates the Fourth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution, and evidence obtained as a 
result of the illegal seizure must be excluded. Terry, 
supra, at 15. 
The exclusionary rule applies not only to evidence 
obtained directly as a result of the illegal seizure, but 
also to evidence obtained by exploitation of the 
illegality, unless the evidence was obtained by means 
"sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary 
taint." Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); 
State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Ut. 1990); and State v. 
Ramirez, 817 P. 2d 774 (Ut. 1991). 
When SPOTTS initially stopped, he did so voluntarily. 
Consequently, Weinmuller was in a position to observe SPOTTS 
legally, at least initially. She also apparently had a clear field 
of vision, as she was at a distance of approximately ten (10) feet, 
it was mid-afternoon, and the weather was clear (TT. 4-6). From 
her position, it was clear that she was observing the Defendant, 
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SPOTTS (TT. 5 and 6). She watched as SPOTTS smoked from a hand-
rolled cigarette, approximately one-half (h) inch long, that burned 
rapidly. She could see the orange on the end of the cigarette as 
he inhaled and could see that it rapidly disintegrated, not as a 
normal cigarette would. She thought from her experience with 
friends in high school and from her POST training, that the 
cigarette contained marijuana (TT. 6). However, it wasn't until 
after she had stopped the vehicle and SPOTTS had opened the door 
that she smelled an odor she associated with marijuana (TT. 7, 14 
and 17) . Weinmuller was aware that tobacco could be rolled into a 
cigarette in a similar fashion but had never seen a hand-rolled 
tobacco cigarette and was unaware whether a hand-rolled tobacco 
cigarette burned any differently than a hand-rolled marijuana 
cigarette. She testified that the way the cigarette burned could 
have been as much a factor of the manner in which it was rolled as 
the substance that was inside of it (TT. 14-16). 
SPOTTS is aware that "[i]n developing a reasonable articulable 
suspicion, law enforcement officers are entitled to reach "common 
sense conclusions about human behavior" [United States v. Sokolow, 
490 U.S. 1 (1989) and State v. Smith, 188 UAR 8 (Ut. App. 1992)] 
and that "a trained law enforcement officer may be able to perceive 
and articulate meaning in given conduct which would be wholly 
innocent to the untrained observer." State v. Truiillo, supra, and 
State v. Baumqaertel. 762 P.2d 2 (Ut. App. 1988). However, this 
Court has been traditionally and consistently reluctant to justify 
stops based upon a person's conduct that is "consistent with 
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innocent as well as criminal behavior." State v. Sierra, supra. 
This philosophy is represented in the several holdings that have 
recognized that nervous behavior when confronted by a police 
officer does not give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity. See, for example, State v. Godina-Luna, 826 P. 2d 652 
(Ut. App. 1992); State v. Mendoza/Mendieta, 748 P.2d 181 (Ut. 
1987); State v. Serv. 758 P.2d 935 (Ut. 1988); State v. Schlosser, 
774 P.2d 1132 (Ut. 1989); State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431 (Ut. App. 
1990); and State v. Arroyo, supra. See also State v. Lovegren, 
supra, wherein a panel of this Court refused to uphold a detention 
based upon a car's interior that had a "lived in" look and the fact 
that the occupants wore sunglasses and had a travel map - facts 
that the officer had observed in drug courier stops. The Lovegren 
Court also noted that the detention could not be based on bloodshot 
eyes that are as consistent with dust in one's eyes or lack of 
sleep as with the presence of drugs or alcohol. 
SPOTTS is likewise aware that this Court has recognized "that 
probable cause for arrest may arise from an officer's sense of 
smell." State v. Bart ley, 784 P.2d 1231 (Ut. App. 1989). More 
specifically, this Court has recognized that the "plain view" 
doctrine under the Fourth Amendment encompasses the plain smell of 
marijuana and marijuana smoke. State v. Naisbitt, 827 P. 2d 969 
(Ut. App. 1992) . The Naisbitt court cited to numerous federal 
decisions holding that the odor of marijuana constitutes probable 
cause to search an automobile under the automobile exception. The 
reasoning behind this line of federal cases is that "probable cause 
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may be supported by the detection of distinctive odors, as well as 
by sight." United States v. Sifuentes, 504 F.2d 845 (4th Cir. 
1974); United States v. Gills, 357 F.2d 299 (4th Cir. 1966); United 
States v. Haynie, 637 F.2d 227 (4th Cir. 1980); and United States 
v. Burrow, 396 F.Sup. 890 (Dis. of Maryland 1975). What makes 
these "plain smell" cases different from Sierra, Arroyo, Lovearen, 
and the stop in this case, is the officer's ability to distinguish 
criminal conduct from innocent behavior. In the "plain smell" 
cases, the officers pointed to distinct odors. In Sierra, Arroyo, 
Lovearen, and this case, the officers observed behavior that they 
had associated with criminal activity on other occasions but 
behavior which is not distinct from innocent behavior. Here, while 
Weinmuller observed activity she had associated with drug use, the 
totality of what she observed prior to the stop was also consistent 
with innocent behavior. 
In State v. Chambers, 687 P.2d 805 (Or. App. 1984), the Court 
of Appeals of Oregon faced a factual setting similar to this one. 
An officer familiar with controlled substances, narcotics and 
dangerous drugs observed an occupant of a car repeatedly lighting 
a pipe. The officer testified he was aware that it is often hard 
to keep marijuana or hashish burning in a pipe bowl and, therefore, 
stopped the car on the suspicion that the occupant was smoking 
either marijuana or hashish. The Oregon court reasoned that the 
fact that pipes must often be relit is probably as attributable to 
their design as to the substance being smoked in them and, 
therefore, refused to validate the stop. 
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SPOTTS asserts that the officer in Chambers and Officer 
Weinmuller in this case would have each had reasonable suspicion to 
stop the automobiles had they smelled the distinctive odor of 
marijuana prior to the stop. However, the Oregon court was correct 
in determining that the officer in Chambers saw nothing that would 
distinguish criminal from innocent behavior. This Court should 
also find that prior to stopping SPOTTS' truck, Officer Weinmuller 
observed no activity which was inconsistent with innocent behavior 
and should therefor find that no reasonable suspicion existed upon 
which to base the stop. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY ADMITTED SPOTTS1 PRE-ARREST 
STATEMENTS, NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE CITY HAD FAILED TO 
INDEPENDENTLY ESTABLISH A CORPUS DELICTI. 
The Standard of Review. 
Rulings on admission of evidence are questions of law reviewed 
for correctness, except that the trial court's subsidiary factual 
determination should be given deference by the appellate court and 
only be overruled when they are clearly erroneous. State v. 
Ramirez, supra, and State v. Taylor, supra. "Even when evidence is 
found to be improperly admitted, reversal is only required where 
admission of the evidence amounted to prejudicial error." State v. 
Dibello. 780 P.2d 1221 (Ut. 1989); State v. Larsen, 775 P.2d 415 
(Ut. 1989) and State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032 (Ut. 1987). "[A] 
trial court's ruling that the corpus delicti rule does not bar 
admission of the [defendant's] statements is a question of law, and 
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accordingly, our standard of review is correctness." State v. 
Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150 (Ut. App. 1991); Rawlins v. Petersen, 813 
P.2d 1156 (Ut. 1991); and Landes v. Capital Citv Bank, 795 P.2d 
1127 (Ut. 1990). 
"The rule is quite universal that an extra judicial 
confession, by itself, is not sufficient to sustain a conviction of 
a crime, but there must be evidence, independent of the confession 
to establish the corpus delicti." State v. Weldon, 314 P. 2d 353 
(Ut. 1957) . "Under the Utah corpus delicti rule, before post-crime 
inculpatory statements are admissible, the State must show by clear 
and convincing evidence that (i) a wrong was done and (ii) such 
wrong was the result of criminal conduct." State v. Johnson, 821 
P.2d 1150 (Ut. 1991). SPOTTS asserts that the City did not 
establish by clear and convincing evidence, independent of any of 
his statements, that the substance he possessed was a controlled 
substance (and, therefor that "a wrong was done") and that 
consequently none of his statements should have been admitted. 
After he was seized but before he was taken into custody, 
SPOTTS had a dialogue with Officer Weinmuller about the cigarette. 
Regarding that conversation, Officer Weinmuller testified, "I asked 
him what had happened to it. He said he gave it to his friend." 
Later, still on direct examination, Weinmuller testified, "Well, 
yeah, I was talking with him, I was asking where the cigarette was, 
where the marijuana cigarette was—." She explained that SPOTTS 
responded, "He said he gave it to his friend." She testified 
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further, "I asked him what he did with it, he said he gave it back 
to his friend as he exited the vehicle. I asked him how many hits 
he had had off of it, he said a few. I told him that it was 
illegal to possess marijuana and to operate a vehicle while 
impaired by marijuana, and he said, [']Do You think I would be 
driving if it was going to effect my driving?[•]" (TT. 10-11). 
SPOTTS1 statements, to the extent that they are even 
inculpatory, should not have been admitted because without them, 
the prosecution was unable to establish, by clear and convincing 
evidence, that he possessed an identifiable amount of marijuana. 
Absent the statement, the prosecution had established that 
Officer Weinmuller had observed SPOTTS smoking a small, rolled up 
cigarette about one-half (h) inch long that burned rapidly. After 
she had waived him over, she smelled the odor of what she had 
experienced to be marijuana. She observed his speech was slow, his 
eyes were bloodshot and that his eye movements were very jerky (TT. 
6-9) . But she did not discover any substance that clearly and 
convincingly appeared to be marijuana. 
As noted above, this Court in State v. Naisbitt, supra, ruled 
that the "plain view" exception under the Fourth Amendment 
encompasses evidence within plain smell. The Naisbitt court 
concluded that officers who smell burning marijuana have 
established probable cause for a search under the federal 
interpretation of the automobile exception. But the Naisbitt court 
did not go further and rule that the smell of marijuana smoke can 
also support proof of the existence of marijuana. In fact, in 
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footnote 8 of its decision, the Naisbitt court stated, "[w]e make 
no statement as to whether our decision would be the same if 
Trooper Bushnell's search had not, in fact, found marijuana in the 
vehicle." 
SPOTTS concedes that Officer Weinmuller had established proper 
probable cause for a search, but nothing more. In ruling on 
SPOTTS1 motion to suppress evidence of his statements, the court 
stated, "I believe there is still a prima facie case in terms of 
what the officer observed, characteristics that were consistent 
with [the] use of drugs and the—the distinctive smell that was 
emanating from his person,...11 However, since everything that the 
officer had observed was just as consistent with innocent as with 
criminal behavior (i.e. the "marijuana" cigarette could not be 
distinguished from a tobacco cigarette, bloodshot eyes are as 
consistent with dirt in one's eyes or with being tired as with 
criminal behavior) and because the odor of marijuana establishes 
only probable cause for a search, the court had nothing before it 
from which to conclude, absent the statements, that marijuana was 
actually present. 
If this Court concludes that SPOTTS1 statements were 
erroneously admitted, it must also rule that such error was not 
harmless, as the trial court found that the statements were 
critical to its guilty verdict. Rule 30(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure provides: "Any error, defect, irregularity or 
variance which does not affect the substantial rights of the 
parties shall be disregarded." 
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SPOTTS1 statements were admitted with absolutely no direct 
evidence offered or admitted on the identity of the substance he 
was alleged to have possessed. Admittedly Weinmuller established 
probable cause for a search but ultimately discovered nothing that 
confirmed her suspicions or that provided clear and convincing 
proof of the actual existence of a controlled substance. The 
nature of SPOTTS' statements turned the trial court in favor of a 
finding of guilt. In stating its findings prior to entering its 
verdict, the trial court commented on SPOTTS' argument that a 
conviction required that there be some marijuana introduced into 
evidence, or at least a competent analysis of the substance or of 
the blood of SPOTTS to establish the presence of marijuana. The 
court responded "I think that would be true if there was not an 
admission on the part of the defendant,.... If he did not respond 
or simply said it was tobacco, then I frankly think that the City 
has to produce something" (TT. 4 3-44). The trial court obviously 
found that the conviction rested on SPOTTS1 failure to adamantly 
refute Weinmullerfs characterization of the cigarette and on his 
statements which it mistakenly referred to as "admissions". This 
Court should therefore determine the trial court committed 
reversible error because the error in admitting SPOTTS1 statements 
was not so "inconsequential that . . . there is no reasonable 
likelihood that the error effected the outcome of the proceedings." 
State v Kniaht. 734 P.2d 913 (Utah, 1987). 
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POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE ADMITTED AT TRIAL WAS INSUFFICIENT TO 
ESTABLISH THE IDENTITY OF THE SUBSTANCE POSSESSED BY SPOTTS 
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT 
The Standard of Review, 
A. At the close of the City's evidence, SPOTTS made a motion 
to dismiss (TT. 19-22). Section 77-17-3, Utah Code Annotated 
controls rulings on such motions and provides "[w]hen it appears to 
the court that there is not sufficient evidence to put a defendant 
to his defense, it shall forthwith order him discharged." 
"When a motion for a directed verdict is made at the close of the 
[prosecution's] case, the trial court should dismiss the charge if 
the [prosecution] did not establish a prima facie case against the 
defendant by producing 'believable evidence of all of the elements 
of the crime charged.'" State v. Emmett, 184 UAR 34 (Ut. 1992). 
See also State v. Taylor, supra. 
B. SPOTTS also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in 
support of the ultimate verdict. "In reviewing the sufficiency of 
the evidence at a bench trial, as occurred here, [the appellate 
court] will not set aside the verdict unless clearly erroneous, and 
where the result is against the clear weight of the evidence, or 
[the appellate court] otherwise reaches a definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been made. State v. Walker, 743 P. 2d 
191 (Ut. 1987); State v. Pelton. 801 P.2d 184 (Ut. App. 1990); 
State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474 (Ut. 1991); State v. Pedersen, 802 
P.2d 1328 (Ut. App. 1990); State v. Strieby, 790 P.2d 98 (Ut. App. 
1990); and State v. Miller, 740 P.2d 1363 (Ut. App. 1987). 
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Marshalling. 
When challenging the findings of fact of the trial court on 
appeal, the appellant must show that the findings of fact were 
clearly erroneous. In order to show clear error, the appellant 
must marshall all of the evidence in support of the trial court's 
findings of fact and then demonstrate that the evidence, including 
all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to 
support the findings against an attack. State v. Moosman, supra; 
State v. Moore, 801 P.2d 732 (Ut. App. 1990) 
"Due process requires the prosecution to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime 
charged." State v. Sorenson, 758 P.2d 466 (Ut. App. 1988). "We 
will not make "speculative leaps across...remaining gaps' in the 
evidence. Every element of the crime charged must be proven beyond 
a reasonable doubt. If the evidence does not support those 
elements, the verdict must fail." State v. Harmon, 767 P.2d 567 
(Ut. App. 1989) and State v. Striebv, supra. "Utah Code 
Annotated, §76-1-501 requires that each element of a criminal 
offense be proven beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. James, 819 
P.2d 781 (Ut. 1991) and State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150 (Ut. 1991). 
In this matter, SPOTTS is specifically charged with possessing a 
controlled substance, to wit: Marijuana. "Where possession of 
narcotics is the jest of the offense charged, the government must 
establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the substance involved is 
that specified in the indictment." State v. Schofill, 621 P. 2d 364 
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(HI 1980). Therefore, if SPOTTS• conviction is to stand, the City 
must have introduced some believable evidence on the identity of 
the substance allegedly possessed to survive SPOTTS1 motion for 
dismissal at the close of their evidence, and must have proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt the identity of marijuana in SPOTTS1 
possession in order to sustain the ultimate finding of guilt. 
The evidence that was available to the trial court on the 
issue of the identification of the substance allegedly possessed by 
SPOTTS is as follows: SPOTTS was observed smoking a one-half (h) 
inch long hand-rolled cigarette that burned rapidly (TT. 6). The 
officer smelled a strong odor that she associated with marijuana 
about his person (TT. 7-9). He talked "real slow," and his eyes 
were bloodshot and jerky. SPOTTS admitted to giving whatever it 
was that he had smoked to his friend and he did not unequivocally 
challenge Officer Weinmullerfs characterization of it as a 
marijuana cigarette (TT. 10-11). The time of the occurrence was 
approximately 3:30 p.m. on Saturday, September 28, 1991 (TT. 4). 
The business where the incident took place was not open and there 
were no other vehicles in the parking lot (TT. 18). 
Although it does not appear that Utah has ever set forth a 
precise quantum or method for establishing the identity of a 
suspected controlled substance, in State v. Winters, 396 P.2d 872 
(Ut. 1964) and State v. Warner, 788 P.2d 1041 (Ut. App. 1990), both 
the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of Appeals rejected the 
"useability" argument. The Warner court quoted the Winters' court 
for the holding that lf[t]he determinative test is possession of a 
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narcotic drug, and not useability of a narcotic drug." In both 
Winters and Warner an identif icible amount of a controlled substance 
was seized by an officer and analyzed by a chemist. Both of these 
cases imply that at lease "some" amount must have been observed and 
must have been competently identified. This would be consistent 
with other jurisdictions that require an identifiable amount. 
Regardless of the amount, however minute, if it is enough 
for the officers to recover, as small as it may be, and 
capable of being identified by expert chemical analysis, 
such testimony would be sufficiently considered with 
other evidence as to possession. J.D. Partain v. The 
State, 288 SE.2d 292 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976). 
If the controlled substance can be seen and measured, we 
conclude that the amount is sufficient to establish the 
defendant knew it was a controlled substance. Thomas v. 
State, 807 SW.2d 786 (Tx. Ct. App. 1991). 
A review of the law from other jurisdictions reveals a 
majority of jurisdictions hold possession of the residue 
of a contraband drug, so long as the residue is capable 
of being identified, is sufficient to support a 
conviction for possession. State v. Robinson, 411 SE.2d 
678 (S. Ca. Ct. App. 1991). 
In State v. Miller. supra, this Court sustained the 
identification of a controlled substance (marijuana) that had been 
seized pursuant to search warrant. The trial court had found the 
substance properly identified on the strength of objective 
observations of a professional narcotics agent and scientific 
tests. It is not clear whether the marijuana was introduced at 
trial. In State v. Hull, 487 P.2d 1314 (Mont. 1971), the seized 
controlled substance was analyzed but not introduced at trial. 
Instead, the results of the analysis were introduced by the 
chemist. That court ruled, "[w]e are aware of no requirement that 
the alleged dangerous drug must be introduced at the trial." In 
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Corry v. State, 543 P.2d 565 (Okl. Ct. App. 1975), the 
identification of marijuana was upheld on the testimony of the 
sheriff who seized the substance and identified it based on his 
police training on the subject and experience with the substance in 
the course of police investigations. No chemical analysis was 
performed in this case. 
Utah has little case law on the requirements for 
identification of a controlled substance. However, the foregoing 
cases from Utah and other jurisdictions indicate that 
identification has been upheld regardless of whether there was a 
useable amount, regardless of whether the substance was introduced 
at trial, and regardless of whether or not an expert qualified by 
formal scientific education gave an opinion. But, an important 
common thread that runs through all of these cases is that in each, 
an identifiable quantum of the alleged controlled substance was 
observed and seized and either analyzed by an expert or otherwise 
competently identified by someone who examined the seized substance 
and who was familiar with the illicit substance by experience or 
education. In contrast, in this case, no substance was observed or 
seized or compared to a known illicit substance and the 
"identification" of the substance was based on facts that are 
arguably sufficient to establish probable cause but which have not 
been found to support a conviction in any other case discovered by 
SPOTTS. 
Utah upholds criminal convictions based on purely 
circumstantial evidence. State v. Span. 819 P.2d 329 (Ut. 1991); 
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State v. Nickles. 728 P.2d 123 (Ut. 1986); State v. Franks, 649 
P.2d 3 (Ut. 1982); and State v. Clayton, 646 P.2d 723 (Ut. 1982). 
Similarly, in State v. Hutton, 502 P.2d 1037 (Wa. Ct. App. 1972), 
the Washington Court of Appeals recognized "ample authority for the 
proposition that the identity of a drug, in a possession or 
distribution case, can be established by circumstantial evidence." 
That court went on to say, " [o]rdinarily, however, not only 
prudence but necessity as well would dictate that some expression 
of opinion through expertise, acquired through education or 
experience, be expressed to support the identity of the substance 
possessed or distributed." That court reversed a conviction for 
distribution of amphetamine that had been based on the testimony of 
a lay person who had testified that defendant gave her a white 
flaky substance, which gave her a "tingling" feeling, and that she 
had "heard" the substance was speed. She also testified that on a 
later occasion, she had asked the defendant "for some speed" and he 
gave her a substance that made her feel "a little high." No 
substance nor analysis was introduced at trial. The Washington 
Court of Appeals found the lay person's opinion insufficient to 
establish the identity of the substance. 
In a line of federal controlled substance cases involving fact 
situations where substances had been consumed or distributed, 
federal courts have held that "lay testimony and circumstantial 
evidence may be sufficient, without the introduction of an expert 
chemical analysis, to establish the identity of the substance 
involved in an alleged narcotics transaction." United States v. 
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Gregorio, 497 F.2d 1253 (4th Cir. 1984). In United States v. 
Dolan, 544 F.2d 1219 (4th Cir. 1976), the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals set out six (6) factors that may be included in sufficient 
circumstantial proof of the identity of a controlled substance: (a) 
evidence of the physical appearance of the substance involved, (b) 
evidence that the substance produced the expected effects when 
sampled by someone familiar with the elicit drug, (c) evidence that 
the substance was used in the same manner as the elicit drug, (d) 
testimony that a high price was paid in cash for the substance, (e) 
evidence that transactions involving the substance were carried out 
in secrecy or deviousness, and (f) evidence that the substance was 
called by the name of the illegal narcotic by the defendant or 
others in his presence. See also United States v. Scott, 725 F.2d 
43 (4th Cir. 1984). 
Other federal circuit courts of appeal have similarly ruled 
that the identification of a controlled substance can be 
established by circumstantial evidence: 
Illegal drugs will often be unavailable for scientific 
analysis because their nature is to be consumed... .To our 
knowledge, no court has held that scientific 
identification of a substance is an absolute prerequisite 
to conviction for a drug-related offense, and we too are 
unwilling to announce such a rule. In view of the 
limitations that such a burden would place on 
prosecutors, and in accordance with general evidentiary 
principles, courts have held that the government may 
establish the identity of a drug through cumulative 
circumstantial evidence. United States v. Schrock, 855 
F.2d 327 (6th Cir. 1988). See also, United States v. 
Osgood, 794 F.2d 1087 (5th Cir. 1986); United States v. 
Meeks, 857 F.2d 1201 (8th Cir. 1988); United States v. 
Eakes, 783 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1986) ; and United States v. 
Brown. 887 F.2d 537 (5th Cir. 1989). 
While these holdings don't specifically set out the same six (6) 
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factors as Dolan, those same factors are nevertheless present in 
the facts of each of these cases. 
The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals has adopted the Dolan six-
point test for the establishment of the identity of a controlled 
substance by circumstantial evidence. In United States v. Sanchez 
De Fundora. 893 F.2d 1173 (10th Cir. 1990), the court stated: 
The government need not introduce scientific evidence to 
prove the identity of a substance. As long as there is 
sufficient lay testimony or circumstantial evidence from 
which a jury could find that a substance was identified 
beyond a reasonable doubt, the lack of scientific 
evidence does not warrant reversal. Sanchez-De Fundura, 
at 1175. 
The court went on to examine and explain how the six-point Dolan 
test had been complied with in each of Sanchez De Fundora's eight 
(8) separate counts of distribution of cocaine. 
However, United States v. Baggett, 890 F.2d 1095 (10th Cir. 
1989), shows that the 10th Circuit recognizes there are limitations 
to the use of circumstantial evidence to establish the identity of 
a controlled substance. In Baggett, the 10th Circuit Court cited 
the six-point Dolan test with authority but reversed Baggett's 
conviction for possession of a controlled substance. It did so, 
stating: 
It is not necessary that the Government have direct 
evidence to support a conviction for possession. But 
where, as in this case, the Government fails to seize and 
analyze the chemical composition of the alleged narcotic 
substance, there must be enough circumstantial evidence 
to support an inference that the defendant actually did 
possess the drugs in question. Baggett, at 1096. 
.... 
If the prosecution is not going to present direct 
evidence of drug possession, its circumstantial evidence 
must include some testimony linking defendant to an 
observed substance that a jury can infer to be a 
narcotic. Baggett, at 1097. (Emphasis added.) 
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Baggett's telephone conversations with a suspected drug dealer 
had been intercepted and she had been heard to arrange for the 
purchase of cocaine and heroin. Later, Baggett was observed 
meeting with the drug dealer at the pre-arranged location. 
However, no government witness testified to having seen a substance 
that appeared to be a controlled substance, or that the substance 
produced effects similar to a known controlled substance, or that 
the substance was used in the same manner as an elicit drug, or 
that any money was exchanged. The government's case consisted 
primarily of the secrecy of Baggett's actions in meeting with a 
suspected drug dealer coupled with her having referred to cocaine 
and heroin in the intercepted telephone calls in which she arranged 
for the meeting. The 10th Circuit found the totality of the 
circumstantial evidence insufficient to support a conviction, 
stating: 
Courts typically require much stronger evidence before 
holding it sufficient to meet the Government's burden of 
proof. See, e.g., Scott, 725 F.2d at 46 (finding that 
"[e]very fact listed in Dolan for establishing 
circumstantially the illegal character of the [substance] 
possessed by the defendant was present). Baggett, at 
1097. 
Just as with the state cases cited above, there is a common 
thread running through these federal cases in which convictions 
were upheld. Although no drugs were seized or introduced at trial, 
in each successful conviction, there was "an observed substance" 
that was competently identified beyond a reasonable doubt by the 
testimony of a witness who observed it and by application of the 
six-point Dolan test or a similarly strict standard. 
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If the six-point Dolan test were applied to this case, SPOTTS 
conviction would fail. As in Baggett, there was no observed 
substance. No witness testified that the physical appearance of an 
observed substance was consistent with the physical appearance of 
a known controlled substance; no one familiar with the illicit drug 
testified to sampling the observed substance and concluding that it 
produced effects similar to the illicit drug; no testimony was 
admitted that a high price was paid in cash for the substance; 
and, importantly, the "drug" was not used in secrecy or 
deviousness, but was smoked openly in broad daylight in full view 
of Officer Weinmuller's car that was presumably at least as 
noticeable to SPOTTS as SPOTTS1 truck was to Weinmuller. 
The only evidence introduced by the City that meets any of the 
factors of the six point Dolan test was that a) the substance 
appeared to be used in the same manner as marijuana and b) SPOTTS 
did not adamantly challenge Weinmuller's characterization of his 
cigarette as a marijuana cigarette. And, of course, SPOTTS 
challenges the admissibility of his statements. Even assuming the 
statements were properly admitted, neither SPOTTS nor his companion 
made any incriminating references such that it can be inferred that 
SPOTTS either made or acquiesced in statements against his own 
interest. Rather, the references to marijuana were made by 
Weinmuller in an accusatory or investigatory context, after SPOTTS 
was seized. 
At best, the City proved only that SPOTTS smoked from a hand-
rolled cigarette that looked like a marijuana "joint", that he had 
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about him a smell that Weinmuller associated with burning 
marijuana, and that his eyes were bloodshot and his speech "real 
slow". No evidence was offered to establish the physical appearance 
of an observed substance, nor that the substance produced an effect 
similar to that expected from marijuana, nor that the substance was 
exchanged for an inordinately high price, nor that the substance 
was used secretively (in fact it is clear the use was open and 
notorious), nor that SPOTTS or his companion called the substance 
by the name of an illegal narcotic. The facts of this case do not 
remotely approach the level of the evidence supporting the 
foregoing successful federal prosecutions for controlled substance 
violations based on circumstantial evidence. Rather, the facts of 
this case are more factually similar to the facts of Baggett. 
With this case, this Court can decide what quantum and manner 
of proof is required for the establishment of the identity of a 
controlled substance. Under any of the foregoing tests, this 
particular case must be reversed. However, this Court should take 
the opportunity to set a standard for future prosecutions. 
Hopefully, that standard will require the introduction of the 
seized suspected controlled substance as well as the introduction 
of a competent chemical analysis supported by the opinion of an 
expert qualified by formal scientific education to analyze and 
identify the substance. Alternatively - but not preferably - if 
this Court rules that a conviction does not require the 
introduction of either the controlled substance or a chemical 
analysis, at the very least, there should be evidence linking 
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Defendant to an observed substance that can be circumstantially 
identified by application of a test at least as rigorous as the 
six-point Dolan test. This Court should not uphold convictions 
based not on an observed and competently identified substance, but 
on the theory that "where there is smoke, there is fire." 
CONCLUSIONS 
SPOTTS was illegally seized; all evidence derived from that 
seizure should be ordered suppressed, SPOTTS1 statements should 
have been suppressed as the City failed to independently establish 
a corpus delecti. This Court should find the evidence insufficient 
to support the ultimate judgment and should enter its order 
reversing the conviction. "Double jeopardy bars the retrial of a 
defendant when an appellate court declares the evidence to be 
insufficient to sustain a conviction." Burks v. United States, 437 
U.S. 1 (1978); Greene v. Massev. 437 U.S. 1 (1978); State v. Webb. 
779 P.2d 1108 (Ut. 1989); and State v. Sorenson, supra. 
DATED this ^QT^v day of July, 1992. 
THOMAfe if. MEANS 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
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I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, four (4) 
copies of the foregoing Brief of Defendant-Appellant to Gary 
Gregorson and Vernon F. Romney, Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee, 
at P.O. Box 1849, Provo, UT 84603, this ~~2^ ~X„ day of July, 1992. 
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ADDENDUM 
Constitution of the United States, Amendment IV 
Provo City Ordinances, 9/58-37-8(2)(a)(i) 
Utah Code Annotated, §58-37-8(2)(a)(i) 
Utah Code Annotated, §76-1-501 
Utah Code Annotated, §77-7-15 
Utah Code Annotated, §77-17-3 
Utah Code Annotated, §78-2a-3(2)(d) 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 24(a)(7) 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 30(a) 
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Amend. Ill CONSTITUTION OF 
AMENDMENT III 
[Quartering soldiers.l 
No Soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in 
any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in 
time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law. 
11
 AkENDMENTIV 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreason-
able searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 1 
AMklNlMiM v 
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — 
Due process of law and just compensation 
clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or 
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment 
or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising 
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor 
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor shall private property 
be taken for public use, without just compensation. 
AMENDMENT VI 
[Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial 
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed, which district shall have been 
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of 
the nature and cause of the accusation; to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him; to have com-
pulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, 
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence. 
AMENDMENT VII 
[Trial by jury in civil cases.] 
In Suits at common law, where the value in contro-
versy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by 
jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, 
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the 
United States, than according to the rules of the com-
mon law. 
AMENDMENT VHI 
[Bail — Punishment] 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive 
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments 
inflicted. 
AMENDMENT IX 
[Rights retained by people.] 
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain 
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage 
others retained by the people. 
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AMENDMENT X 
[Powers reserved to states or people.] 
The powers not delegated to the United States by 
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States 
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the peo-
ple. 
AMENDMENT XI 
[Suits against states — Restriction of judicial 
power.] 
The judicial power of the United States shall not be 
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, com-
menced or prosecuted against one of the United 
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or 
Subjects of any Foreign State. 
AMENDMENT XII 
[Election of President and Vice-President.] 
The Electors shall meet in their respective states, 
and vote by ballot for President and Vice-President, 
one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of 
the same state with themselves; they shall name in 
their ballots the person voted for as President, and in 
distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-Presi-
dent, and they shall make distinct lists of all persons 
voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as 
Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each, 
which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit 
sealed to the seat of the Government of the United 
States, directed to the President of the Senate;—The 
President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the 
Senate and House of Representatives, open all the 
certificates and the votes shall then be counted;—The» 
person having the greatest number of votes for Presi^ 
dent, shall be the President, if such number be a ma-
jority of the whole number of Electors appointed; and 
if no person have such majority, then from the per^ . 
sons having the highest numbers not exceeding three 
on the list of those voted for as President, the House 
of Representatives shall choose immediately, by bal-^  
lot, the President. But in choosing the President, the^  
votes shall be taken by states, the representation^ 
from each state having one vote; a quorum for thif^  
purpose shall consist of a member or members from' 
two-thirds of the states, and a majority of all the 
states shall be necessary to a choice. And if the House 
of Representatives shall not choose a President when-
ever the right of choice shall devolve upon them, be-
fore the fourth day of March next following, then the 
Vice-President shall act as President, as in the case rf 
the death or other constitutional disability of the 
President.—The person having the greatest number 
of votes as Vice-President, shall be the Vice-Prosi* 
dent, if such number be a majority of the whole num^ 
her of Electors appointed, and if no person have.t* 
majority, then from the two highest numbers on wi 
list, the Senate shall choose the Vice-President^ 
quorum for the purpose shall consist of two-thiW»j 
the whole number of Senators, and a majority of Ug 
whole number shall be necessary to a choice. Batggj 
person constitutionally ineligible to the office °^^?fe 
ident shall be eligible to that of Vice-President of Wl 
United States. 
AMENDMENT XIII 
Section 
1. [Slavery prohibited.] 
2. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
233 OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS t J O - « J • ~K* 
under this subsection is guilty of a third de-
felon 
rohTbTted ax* (2) P i ite  acts B — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and inten-
tionally to possess or use a controlled sub-
stance, unless it was obtained under a valid 
prescription or order, directly from a practi-
tioner while acting in the course of his pro-
fessional practice, or as otherwise authorized 
TnMor any owner, tenant, licensee, or per-
son in control of any building, room, tene-
ment, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place 
knowingly and intentionally to permit them 
to be occupied by persons unlawfully possess-
ing, using, or distributing controlled sub-
stances in any of those locations; 
(iii) for any person knowingly and inten-
tionally to be present where controlled sub-
stances are being used or possessed in viola-
tion of this chapter and the use or possession 
is open, obvious, apparent, and not concealed 
from those present; however, a person may 
not be convicted under this subsection if the 
evidence shows that he did not use the sub-
stance himself or advise, encourage, or assist 
anyone else to do so; any incidence of prior 
unlawful use of controlled substances by the 
defendant may be admitted to rebut this de-
fense; 
(iv) for any person knowingly and inten-
tionally to possess an altered or forged pre-
scription or written order for a controlled 
substance; 
(v) for a practitioner licensed under this 
chapter knowingly mid intentionally to pre-
scribe, administer, or dispense a controlled 
substance to a juvenile, without first obtain-
ing the consent required in Section 78-14-5 
of a parent, guardian, or person standing in 
loco parentis of the juvenile except in cases 
of an emergency; for purposes of this subsec-
tion, a juvenile means a "child" as defined in 
Section 78-3a-2, and "emergency" means any 
physical condition requiring the administra-
tion of a controlled substance for immediate 
relief of pain or suffering; 
(vi) for a practitioner licensed under this 
chapter knowingly and intentionally to pre-
scribe or administer dosages of a controlled 
substance in excess of medically recognized 
quantities necessary to treat the ailment, 
malady, or condition of the ultimate user; or 
(vii) for any person to prescribe, adminis-
ter, or dispense any controlled substance to 
another person knowing that the other per-
son is using a false name, address, or other 
personal information for the purpose of se-
curing the same, 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsec-
tion (2)(a)(i) with respect to: 
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds 
or more, is guilty of a second degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or 
II, or marijuana, if the amount is more than 
16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, is guilty 
of a third degree felony; or 
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in 
the form of an extracted resin from any part 
of the plant, and the amount is more than 
> one ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty 
of a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsec-
tion (2)(a)(i) while inside the exterior boundaries 
of property occupied by any correctional facility 
as defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or 
other place of confinement shall be sentenced to a 
penalty one degree greater than provided in Sub-
section (2Kb). 
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of 
possession of any controlled substance by a per-
son previously convicted under Subsection (2)(b), 
that person shall be sentenced to a one degree 
greater penalty than provided in this subsection. 
(e) Any person who violates Subsection 
(2)(a)(i) with respect to all other controlled sub-
stances not included in Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), 
or (iii), including less than one ounce of mari-
juana, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. Upon a 
second conviction for possession of a controlled 
substance as provided in this subsection, the per-
son is guilty of a class A misdemeanor, and upon 
a third or subsequent conviction he is guilty of a 
third degree felony. 
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsec-
tions (2)(a)(ii) through (2)(a)(vii) is: 
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor; 
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class 
A misdemeanor; and 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, 
guilty of a third degree felony. 
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person: 
(i) who is subject to this chapter t^o distrib-
ute or dispense a controlled substance in vio-
lation of this chapter; 
(ii) who is a licensee to manufacture, dis-
tribute, or dispense a controlled substance to 
another licensee or other authorized person 
not authorized by his license; 
(iii) to omit, remove, alter, or obliterate a 
symbol required by this chapter or by a rule 
issued under this chapter; 
(iv) to refuse or fail to make, keep, or fur-
nish any record, notification, order form, 
statement, invoice, or information required 
under this chapter; or 
(v) to refuse entry into any premises for 
inspection as authorized by this chapter. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsec-
tion (3)(a) shall be punished by a civil penalty of 
not more than $5,000. The proceedings are inde-
pendent of, and not in lieu of, criminal proceed-
ings under this chapter or any other law of this 
state. If the violation is prosecuted by informa-
tion or indictment which alleges the violation 
was committed knowingly or intentionally, that 
person is upon conviction guilty of a third degree 
felony. 
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly 
and intentionally: 
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture 
or distribution of a controlled substance a 
license number which is fictitious, revoked, 
suspended, or issued to another person or, for 
the purpose of obtaining a controlled sub-
stance, to assume the title of, or represent 
himself to be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, 
apothecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, 
or other authorized person; 
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afferent ways under different provisions of this code, 
he act shall be punishable under only one such provi-
.
 a n acquittal or conviction and sentence under ?
 v such provision bars a prosecution under any 
other such provision. 
<2) Whenever conduct may establish separate of-
-
 s e s under a single criminal episode, unless the 
-oiirt otherwise orders to promote justice, a defendant 
^hall not be subject to separate trials for multiple 
offenses when: 
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a 
single court, and 
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting 
attorney at the time the defendant is arraigned 
on the first information or indictment. 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense in-
cluded in the offense charged but may not be con-
victed of both the offense charged and the included 
offense. An offense is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less 
than all the facts required to establish the com-
mission of the offense charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, con-
spiracy, or form of preparation to commit the of-
fense charged or an offense otherwise included 
therein; or 
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as 
a lesser included offense. 
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the 
jury with respect to an included offense unless there 
is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defen-
dant of the offense charged and convicting him of the 
included offense. 
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or 
judgment, or an appellate court on appeal or certio-
rari, shall determine that there is insufficient evi-
dence to support a conviction for the offense charged 
but that there is sufficient evidence to support a con-
viction for an included offense and the trier of fact 
necessarily found every fact required for conviction of 
that included offense, the verdict or judgment of con-
viction may be set aside or reversed and a judgment 
of conviction entered for the included offense, without 
necessity of a new trial, if such relief is sought by the 
defendant. 1974 
76-1-403. Former prosecution barring subse-
quent prosecution for offense out of 
same episode. 
(1) If a defendant has been prosecuted for one or 
more offenses arising out of a single criminal episode, 
a subsequent prosecution for the same or a different 
offense arising out of the same criminal episode is 
barred if: 
(a) The subsequent prosecution is for an of-
fense that was or should have been tried under 
Subsection 76-1-402(2) in the former prosecution; 
and 
(b) The former prosecution: 
(i) resulted in acquittal; or 
(ii) resulted in conviction; or 
(iii) was improperly terminated; or 
(iv) was terminated by a final order or 
judgment for the defendant that has not been 
reversed, set aside, or vacated and that nec-
essarily required a determination inconsis-
tent with a fact that must be established to 
secure conviction in the subsequent prosecu-
tion. 
(2) There is an acquittal if the prosecution resulted 
Jn a finding of not guilty by the trier of facts or in a 
determination that there was insufficient evidence to 
warrant conviction. A finding of guilty of a lesser 
included offense is an acquittal of the greater offense 
even though the conviction for the lesser included 
offense is subsequently reversed, set aside, or va-
cated. 
(3) There is a conviction if the prosecution resulted 
in a judgment of guilt that has not been reversed, set 
aside, or vacated; a verdict of guilty that has not been 
reversed, set aside, or vacated and that is capable of 
supporting a judgment; or a plea of guilty accepted by 
the court. 
(4) There is an improper termination of prosecu-
tion if the termination takes place before the verdict, 
is for reasons not amounting to an acquittal, and 
takes place after a jury has been impanelled and 
sworn to try the defendant, or, if the jury trial is 
waived, after the first witness is sworn. However, ter-
mination of prosecution is not improper if: 
(a) The defendant consents to the termination; 
or 
(b) The defendant waives his right to object to 
the termination; 
(c) The court finds and states for the record 
that the termination is necessary because: 
(i) It is physically impossible to proceed 
with the trial in conformity with the law; or 
(ii) There is a legal defect in the proceed-
ing not attributable to the state that would 
make any judgment entered upon a verdict 
reversible as a matter of law; or 
(iii) Prejudicial conduct in or out of the 
courtroom not attributable to the state 
makes it impossible to proceed with the trial 
without injustice to the defendant or the 
state; or 
(iv) The jury is unable to agree upon a 
verdict; or 
(v) False statements of a juror on voir dire 
prevent a fair trial. 1974 
76-1-404. Concurrent jurisdiction — Prosecu-
tion in other jurisdiction barring pros-
ecution in state. 
If a defendant's conduct establishes the commission 
of one or more offenses within the concurrent jurisdic-
tion of this state and of another jurisdiction, federal 
or state, the prosecution in the other jurisdiction is a 
bar to a subsequent prosecution in this state if (1) the 
former prosecution resulted in an acquittal, convic-
tion, or termination of prosecution, as those terms are 
defined in Section 76-1-403, and (2) the subsequent 
prosecution is for the same offense or offenses. 1973 
76-1-405. Subsequent prosecution not barred — 
Circumstances. 
A subsequent prosecution for an offense shall not 
be barred under the following circumstances: 
(1) The former prosecution was procured by 
the defendant without the knowledge of the pros-
ecuting attorney bringing the subsequent prose-
cution and with intent to avoid the sentence that 
might otherwise be imposed; or 
(2) The former prosecution resulted in a judg-
ment of guilt held invalid in a subsequent pro-
ceeding on writ of habeas corpus, coram nobis, or 
similar collateral attack. 1973 
PART 5 
RITRDFN OF PROOF 
76-1-501. Presumption of innocence — "Ele-
ment of the offense" defined. 
I ( D A defendant in a criminal proceeding is pre-
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sumed to be innocent until each element of the of-
fense charged against him is proved beyond a reason-
able doubt. In absence of such proof, the defendant 
shall be acquitted. 
(2) As used in this par t the words "element of the 
offense" mean: 
(a) The conduct, a t tendant circumstances, or 
results of conduct proscribed, prohibited, or for-
bidden in the definition of the offense; 
(b) The culpable mental s tate required. 
(3) The existence of jurisdiction and venue are not 
elements of the offense but shall be established by a 
preponderance of the evidence. 1973 
76-1-502. Negat ing defense by allegation or 
1
 proof — When not required. 
Section 76-1-501 does not require negating a de-
fense: 
(1) By allegation in an information, indict-
ment, or other charge; or 
(2) By proof, unless: 
(a) The defense is in issue in the case as a 
result of evidence presented a t trial , ei ther 
by the prosecution or the defense; or 
(b) The defense is an affirmative defense, 
and the defendant has presented evidence of 
such affirmative defense. 1973 
76-1-503. Presumpt ion of fact. 
An evidentiary presumption established by this 
code or other penal s ta tu te has the following conse-
quences: 
(1) When evidence of facts which support the 
presumption exist, the issue of the existence of 
the presumed fact must be submitted to the jury 
unless the court is satisfied tha t the evidence as a 
whole clearly negates the presumed fact; 
(2) In submit t ing the issue of the existence of a 
presumed fact to the jury, the court shall charge 
tha t while the presumed fact must on all evi-
dence be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the 
law regards the facts giving rise to the presump-
tion as evidence of the presumed fact. 1973 
76-1-504. Affirmative defense presented by de-
fendant. 
Evidence of an affirmative defense as defined by 
this code or other s ta tutes shall be presented by the 
defendant. 1973 
P A R T 6 
DEFINITIONS 
76-1-601. Definitions. 
Unless otherwise provided, the following terms ap-
ply to this ti t le: 
(1) "Act" means a voluntary bodily movement 
and includes speech. 
(2) "Actor" means a person whose criminal re-
sponsibility is in issue in a criminal action. 
(3) "Bodily injury" means physical pain, ill-
ness, or any impairment of physical condition. 
(4) "Conduct" means an act or omission. 
(5) "Dangerous weapon" means any item capa-
ble of causing death or serious bodily injury, or a 
facsimile or representation of the item, and: 
(a) the actor's use or apparent intended 
use of the item leads the victim to reason-
ably believe the item is likely to cause death 
or serious bodily injury; or 
(b) the actor represents to the v iSJ 
verbally or in any other manner tha t he ITS 
control of such an item. * T 
(6) "Offense" means a violation of any pejJ 
statute of this state. , j j j 
(7) "Omission" means a failure to act *Jwl 
there is a legal duty to act and the actor is catTf 
ble of acting. ,j±J 
(8) "Person" means an individual, pubUclL! 
private corporation, government, p a r t n e r s l u ^ J 
unincorporated association. "•%.! 
(9) "Possess" means to have physical 
sion of or to exercise dominion or control o] 
tangible property. 
(10) "Serious bodily injury" means bodily^ 
jury that creates or causes serious pe 
disfigurement, protracted loss or impairm< 
the function of any bodily member or organj 
creates a substantial risk of death. 
CHAPTER 2 
PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 
Part 1 
Section 
76-2-101. 
76-2-102. 
76-2-103. 
76-2-104. 
Culpabil ity General ly 
Requirements of criminal conduct* 
criminal responsibility. 
Culpable mental s ta te required^ 
Strict liability. 
Definitions of "intentionally, or 
in tent or willfully"; "knowingly^ 
with knowledge"; "recklessly,^ 
maliciously"; and "criminal ne 
gence or criminally negligent. ' 
Conduct — When defined as oflfei 
Part 2 
Criminal Responsibility for Conduct of 
Another 
76-2-201. 
76-2-202. 
76-2-203. 
76-2-204. 
76-2-205. 
Definitions. 
Criminal responsibility for direct < 
mission of offense or for conduct! 
another. 
Defenses unavai lable in prosecutio 
based on conduct of another . 
Criminal responsibility of corpora te 
or association. 
Criminal responsibility of person f 
conduct in name of corporation'J 
association. 
Part 3 
Defenses to Criminal Responsibility 
76-2-301. 
76-2-302. 
76-2-303. 
76-2-304. 
76-2-304. 
76-2-305. 
76-2-306. 
Person under fourteen years old nofl 
criminally responsible. 
Compulsion. 
Entrapment. 
Ignorance or mistake of fact or la* 
5. Mistake as to victim's age not a 
fense. 
Mental illness — Use as a defense < 
Influence of alcohol or other sulj 
stance voluntarily consumed -
inition. 
Voluntary intoxication. 
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same manner under it as if he had an original war-
rant. 1»80 
77-7-11. P o s s e s s i o n of warrant by arrest ing offi-
cer not required. 
Any peace officer who has knowledge of an out-
standing warrant of arrest may arrest a person he 
reasonably believes to be the person described in the 
warrant, without the peace officer having physical 
possession of the warrant. 1980 
77-7-12. Deta in ing persons suspec ted of shop-
lifting or library theft — Persons au-
thorized. 
(1) A peace officer, merchant, or merchant's em-
ployee, servant, or agent who has reasonable grounds 
to believe that goods held or displayed for sale by the 
merchant have been taken by a person with intent to 
steal may, for the purpose of investigating the unlaw-
ful act and attempting to effect a recovery of the 
goods, detain the person in a reasonable manner for a 
reasonable length of time. 
(2) A peace officer or employee of a library may 
detain a person for the purposes and under the limits 
of Subsection (1) if there are reasonable grounds to 
believe the person violated Part 8, Chapter 6, Title 
76, Library Theft. 1987 
77-7-13. Arrest w i thout warrant b y peace offi-
cer — Reasonable grounds, what con-
stitutes — Exemption from civil or 
criminal liability. 
(1) A peace officer may arrest, without warrant, 
any person [that] he has reasonable ground to believe 
has committed a theft under Part 8, Chapter 6, Title 
76, Library Theft, or of goods held or displayed for 
sale. 
(2) A charge of theft made to a peace officer under 
Part 8, Library Theft, by an employee of a library, or 
by a merchant, merchant's employee, servant, or 
agent constitutes a reasonable ground for arrest, and 
the police officer is relieved from any civil or criminal 
liability. 1987 
77-7-15. Authority of peace officer to stop and 
question suspect — Grounds. 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public 
place when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe 
he has committed or is in the act of committing or is 
attempting to commit a public offense and may de-
mand his name, address and an explanation of his 
actions. i9so 
77-7-16. Authority of peace officer to frisk sus-
pect for dangerous weapon — 
Grounds. 
A peace officer who has stopped a person temporar-
ily for questioning may frisk the person for a danger-
ous weapon if he reasonably believes he or any other 
person is in danger. isso 
77-7-17. Authority of peace officer to take pos-
session of weapons. 
A peace officer who finds a dangerous weapon pur-
suant to a frisk may take and keep it until the com-
pletion of the questioning, at which time he shall ei-
ther return it if lawfully possessed, or arrest such 
person. i»80 
77-7-18. Citation on misdemeanor or infraction 
charge. 
A peace officer, in lieu of taking a person into cus-
tody, any public official of any county or municipality 
charged with the enforcement of the law, and person-
nel employed at an inspection and checking station or 
port of entry under Section 27-12-19 may issue and 
deliver a citation requiring any person subject to ar-
rest or prosecution on a misdemeanor or infraction 
charge to appear at the court of the magistrate before 
whom the person should be taken pursuant to law if 
the person had been arrested. 1990 
77-7-19. Appearance required by citation — Ar-
rest for failure to appear — Transfer of 
cases — Motor vehicle violations — 
Disposition of fines and costs [Effec-
tive until January 1, 19921. 
(1) Persons receiving misdemeanor citations shall 
appear before the magistrate designated in the cita-
tion on or before the time and date specified in the 
citation. 
(2) A citation may not require a person to appear 
sooner than five days or later than 14 days following 
its issuance. 
(3) A person who receives a citation and fails to 
appear on or before the time and date and at the court 
specified is subject to arrest. The magistrate may is-
sue a warrant of arrest. 
) (a) Except where otherwise provided by law, a 
citation or information issued for violations of 
Title 41 shall state that the person receiving the 
citation or information shall appear before the 
magistrate who has jurisdiction over the offense 
charged. 
(b) If the citation or information is issued for 
an offense under the jurisdiction of the justice 
courts and occurs within the geographical bound-
aries of any municipality or county precinct 
where a justice court exists and a justice court 
judge is currently serving, that court is the mag-
istrate before whom the person shall appear. 
(c) However, consistent with Section 78-4-5, 
informations or citations issued for driving under 
the influence of alcohol or drugs, driving with 
blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 
grams or greater, and reckless driving may be 
if filed and tried in the circuit court in the county 
I where the offense occurred without regard to the 
I location of the offense within the county. 
I (5) Any justice court judge may, upon the motion of 
•either the defense attorney or prosecuting attorney, 
•based on a lack of jurisdiction or the disqualification 
Jof the judge, transfer cases to the nearest justice court 
•or the nearest circuit court within the county, except 
•those cases filed under municipal ordinances. 
77-7-14. Person causing detention or arrest of 
person suspected of shoplifting or li-
brary theft — Civil and criminal immu-
nity. 
(1) A peace officer, merchant, or merchant's em-
ployee, servant, or agent who causes the detention of 
a person as provided in Section 77-7-12, or who causes 
the arrest of a person for theft of goods held or dis-
played for sale, is not criminally or civilly liable 
where he has reasonable and probable cause to be-
lieve the person detained or arrested committed a 
theft of goods held or displayed for sale. 
(2) A peace officer or employee of a library who 
causes a detention or arrest of a person under Part 8, 
Chapter 6, Title 76, Library Theft, is not criminally 
or civilly liable where he has reasonable and probable 
cause to believe that the person committed a theft of 
library materials. 1987 
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he, and recommendations for future treatment 
The Board of Pardons shall direct that the defen-
dant serve any or all of the unexpired term of the 
sentence at the state prison, or place the defen-
dant on parole If the Board ofPardon8y pursuant 
to law or administrative rule, considers for parole 
any defendant who has been adjudged guilty and 
mentally ill, the board shall consult with the 
treating facility or agency and an additional re-
port on the condition of the defendant may be 
filed with the board Pending action of the board, 
the defendant shall remain at the facility to 
which he was committed If the defendant is 
placed on parole, t reatment shall, upon the rec-
ommendation of that facility, be made a condi-
tion of parole, and failure to continue treatment 
or other condition of parole except by agreement 
with the designated facility and the Board of Par-
dons is a basis for initiating parole violation 
hearings The period of parole may not be less 
than five years, or until the expiration of the de-
fendant's sentence, whichever comes first, and 
may not be reduced without consideration by the 
Board of Pardons of a current report on the men-
tal health s tatus of the offender 
(5) If a defendant who pleads or is found guilty 
and mentally ill is placed on probation under the 
jurisdiction of the sentencing court, the trial 
judge shall make treatment a condition of proba-
tion if the defendant is shown to be treatable and 
facilities exist for treatment of the offender m a 
probation status Reports as specified by the trial 
judge shall be filed with the probation officer and 
the sentencing court Failure to continue treat-
ment or other condition of probation, except by 
agreement with the treating agency and the sen-
tencing court, is a basis for the initiation of pro-
bation violation hearings The period of proba-
tion may not be less than five years, or until the 
expiration of the defendant's sentence, whichever 
comes first, and may not be reduced by the sen-
tencing court without consideration of a current 
report on the mental health status of the of-
fender Treatment or other care may be provided 
by an agency or division of the Department of 
Human Services, or with the approval of the sen-
tencing court, by any other handicapped services 
provider A report shall be filed with the proba-
tion officer and the sentencing court every three 
months during the period of probation If a mo-
tion on a petition to discontinue probation is 
made by the defendant, the probation officer 
shall request a report A motion on a petition to 
discontinue probation may not be heard more 
than once every six months 1991 
CHAPTER 17 
THE TRIAL 
Section 
77-17-1 
77-17-2 
77-17-3 
77-17-4 
77-17-5 
77-17-6 
Doubt as to degree — Conviction only on 
lowest 
Discharging one of several defendants — 
To testify for state 
Discharge for insufficient evidence 
Conspiracy — Pleading — Evidence — 
Proof necessary 
Proof of corporate existence or powers 
generally 
Lottery tickets — Evidence 
Section 
77-17-7 Conviction on testimony of accomplice 
— Instruction to jury 
77-17-8 Mistake in charging offense — Proce-
dure 
77-17-9 Separation or sequestration of jurors — 
Oath of officer having custody 
77 17-10 Court to determine law, the jury, the 
facts 
77-17-11 Jury to retire for deliberation — Oath of 
officer having custody 
77-17-12 Defendant on bail appearing for trial 
may be committed 
77-17-1. D o u b t a s to d e g r e e — Convic t ion only 
on lowest . 
When it appears the defendant has committed a 
public offense and there is reasonable doubt as to 
which of two or more degrees he is guilty, he shall be 
convicted only of the lower degree i960 
77-17-2. Discharg ing one of s eve ra l defendants 
— To testify for s t a t e . 
When two or more persons are included m the same 
charge, the court may at any time, on the application 
of the prosecuting attorney, direct any defendant to 
be discharged or his case severed so tha t he may be a 
witness for the prosecution 1980 
wm^mm^mmmmmmmammmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm 
77-17-3. D i scharge for insufficient ev idence . 
When it appears to the court tha t there is not suffi-1 
cient evidence to put a defendant to his defense, it 
shall forthwith order him discharged 1990 | 
77-17-4. Consp i racy — P l e a d i n g — E v i d e n c e — t 
Proof neces sa ry . 
On a trial for conspiracy in a case where an overt 
act is necessary to constitute the offense, the defen-
dant shall not be convicted unless one or more overt 
acts are expressly alleged in the information or in-
dictment, and unless one of the acts alleged has been 
proved However, proof of overt acts not alleged m a j 
be given in evidence 1980 
77-17-5. Proof of corporate ex i s tence or powers 
generally. 
In a criminal case the existence, constitution or 
powers of any corporation may be proved by general 
reputation, or by the printed statutes of the state, 
government or country by which this corporation was 
created 1980 
77-17-6. Lo t te ry t icke ts — Ev idence . 
(1) On a trial for violation of any of the lottery 
provisions of the Utah Criminal Code, it is not neces-
sary to prove 
(a) The existence of any lottery in which any 
lottery tickets shall purport to have been issued, 
(b) The actual signing of any ticket or share, 
or pretended share of any pretended lottery, or 
(c) That any lottery ticket, share or interest 
was signed or issued by the authority of any 
manager, or of any person assuming to have au-
thority as manager 
(2) In all cases, proof of the sale, furnishing, bar-
tering or procuring of any lottery ticket, share or in-
terest therein, or of any instrument purporting to be 
a ticket, or part or share of any ticket shall be evi-
dence that the share or interest was signed and is-
sued according to its purport 1980 
77-17-7. Conviction on test imony of accomplice 
— Instruction to jury. 
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78-2a-l , ' *'-»«• ' i ' ^ — 
There is created a court known as the Court of Ap-
peals. The Court of Appeals is a court of record and 
shall have a seal iwe 
78-2a-2. N u m b e r of j u d g e s — 'I'urnis - Ftina-
t ions — Fil ing fees. 
(1) The Court of Appeals consists of seven judges. 
The term of appointment to office as a judge of the 
Court of Appeals is until the first general election 
held more than three years after the effective date of 
the appointment. Thereafter, the term of office of a 
judge of the Court of Appeals is six years and com-
mences on the first Monday in January , next follow-
ing the date of election. A judge whose term expires 
may serve, upon request of the Judicial Council, until 
a successor is appointed and qualified. The presiding 
judge of the Court of Appeals shall receive as addi-
tional compensation $1,000 per annum or fraction 
thereof for the period served. 
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judg-
ment in panels of three judges. Assignment to panels 
shall be by random rotation of all judges of the Court 
of Appeals. The Court of Appeals by rule shall pro-
vide for the selection of a chair for each panel. The 
Court of Appeals may not sit en banc. 
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a 
presiding judge from among the members of the court 
by majority vote of all judges. The term of office of the 
presiding judge is two years and until a successor is 
elected. A presiding judge of the Court of Appeals 
may serve in tha t office no more than two successive 
terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for 
an acting presiding judge to serve in the absence or 
incapacity of the presiding judge. 
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the 
office of presiding judge by majority vote of all judges 
i ota*. i< i ' scluv j ! \ •a1 ai:rn;m^'er 
inel.-i. 
hi act as hais >r> with tht Supreme Oourt 
ri call and preside over (he meetings of the 
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Court and the Judicial Count ll 
(5» Filing fees for the Courl of * T>»MIS -,I* 
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The Citari '^ Appeals has jurisdiction to issut 
1
 aorum<in. .vni*< id to issue all writs and pro-
u cessarv 
a) !,(• ea rn mi » - *Wi *T -di nenus .iiM-i0 
Hid decrees*, or 
<bt in aid of its juribdictuji. 
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, 
ng jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, oven 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from 
formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies 
or appeals from the district court review of infor-
mal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, ex-
cept the Public Service Commission, State Tax 
Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of Oil,! 
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; i 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of^  
political subdivisions of the state or other lo% 
cal agencies; and , 
(ii) a challenge to agency action 'under 
Section 63-46a-12.1; 
wsmkaUm wmw*m (d) appeals from the circuit courts, except 
those from the small claims department of a tir-j-
,JjUit court: . ,.,.1 
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of 
record in criminal cases, except those involving s 
charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from district court in criminal 
cases, except those involving a conviction of a
 c 
first degree or capital felony; \ 
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for ex-
traordinary writs sought by persons who are in-jj 
carcerated or serving any other criminal sen-.^ 
tence, except petitions constituting a challenge to>. 
a conviction of or the sentence for a first degree*', 
or capital felony; ly 
(h) appeals from, district court involving do- j 
mestic relations cases, including, but not limited ^ 
to, divorce, annulment, property division, child 
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and r^ater-'./: 
nity; :*} 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals 
from the Supreme Court. ,-$ 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only 
and by the vote of four judges of the court may certify,? 
to the Supreme Court for original appellate review 
and determination any mat ter over which the CoiH 
of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction.
 ; 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the re-
quirements of Chapter 46b, Title 63, in its review of
 (^  
agency adjudicative proceedings "•"" ^ 
Court of A p p e a l s jurisdict. * 
fective January 1, 1992]. s 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue -
all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and pro-4 
cess necessary: 
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statutes and other authorities cited, with refer-
ences to the pages of the brief where they are 
cited. 
(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction 
of the appellate court. 
(5) A statement of the issues presented for re-
view and the standard of appellate review for 
each issue with supporting authority for each is-
sue. 
(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordi-
nances, rules, and regulations whose interpreta-
tion is determinative shall be set out verbatim 
with the appropriate citation. If the pertinent 
part of the provision is lengthy, the citation alone 
will suffice, and in that event, the provision shall 
be set forth as provided in paragraph (0 of this 
I (7) A statement of the case. The statement 
I shall first indicate briefly the nature of the case, 
I the course of proceedings, and its disposition in 
I the court below. A statement of the facts relevant 
I to the issues presented for review shall follow. 
I All statements of fact and references to the pro-
[ ceedings below shall be supported by citations to 
^^JherecoroMseeDaraf f rap lMe) )^^^^^^^^^^^ 
r""l,l^j?H3ffnma7y"cT1^^ 
arguments, suitably paragraphed, shall be a suc-
cinct condensation of the arguments actually 
made in the body of the brief. It shall not be a 
mere repetition of the heading under which the 
argument is arranged. 
(9) An argument. The argument shall contain 
the contentions and reasons of the appellant with 
respect to the issues presented, with citations to 
the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record 
relied on. 
(10) A short conclusion stating the precise re-
lief sought. 
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee 
shall conform to the requirements of paragraph (a) of 
this rule, except that a statement of the issues or of 
the case need not be made unless the appellee is dis-
satisfied with the statement of the appellant. 
(c) Reply brief. The appellant may file a brief in 
reply to the brief of the appellee, and if the appellee 
has cross-appealed, the appellee may file a brief in 
reply to the response of the appellant to the issues 
presented by the cross-appeal. Reply briefs shall be 
limited to answering any new matter set forth in the 
opposing brief. No further briefs may be filed except 
with leave of the appellate court. 
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will 
be expected in their briefs and oral arguments to keep 
to a minimum references to parties by such designa-
tions as "appellant" and "appellee". It promotes clar-
ity to use the designations used in the lower court or 
in the agency proceedings, or the actual names of 
parties, or descriptive terms such as "the employee," 
"the injured person," "the taxpayer," etc. 
(e) References in briefs to the record. Refer-
ences shall be made to the pages of the original record 
as paginated pursuant to Rule 1Kb), to pages of the 
reporter's transcript, or to pages of any statement of 
the evidence or proceedings or agreed statement pre-
pared pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g). References to 
exhibits shall include exhibit numbers. If reference is 
made to evidence the admissibility of which is in con-
troversy, reference shall be made to the pages of the 
transcript at which the evidence was identified, of-
fered, and received or rejected. 
(f) Reproduction of opinions, statutes, rules, 
regulations, documents , etc. 
(1) Any opinion, memorandum of decision, 
findings of fact, conclusions of law, or order per-
taining to the issues on appeal and any jury in-
structions or other part of the record of central 
importance to the determination of the appeal 
shall be reproduced in the brief or in an adden-
dum to the brief. 
(2) If determination of the issues presented re-
quires the study of statutes, rules, regulations, 
etc., or relevant parts thereof, to the extent not 
set forth under subparagraph (a)(6) of this rule, 
they shall be reproduced in the brief or in an 
addendum at the end, or they may be supplied to 
the court in pamphlet form. 
(g) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the 
court, principal briefs shall not exceed 50 pages, and 
>reply briefs shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of 
pages containing the table of contents, tables of cita-
tions and any addendum containing statutes, rules, 
regulations, or portions of the record as required by 
paragraph (0 of this rule. 
(h) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a 
cross-appeal is filed, the party first filing a notice of 
appeal shall be deemed the appellant for the purposes 
of this rule and Rule 26, unless the parties otherwise 
"rigree or the court otherwise orders. The brief of the 
appellee shall contain the issues and arguments in-
volved in the cross-appeal as well as the answer to 
the brief of the appellant. 
(i) Briefs in cases involving multiple appel-
lants or appellees. In cases involving more than one 
appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated for 
purposes of the appeal, any number of either may join 
in a single brief, and any appellant or appellee may 
adopt by reference any part of the brief of another. 
Parties may similarly join in reply briefs. 
(j) Citation of supplemental authorities. When 
pertinent and significant authorities come to the at-
tention of a party after that party's brief has been 
filed, or after oral argument but before decision, a 
party may promptly advise the clerk of the appellate 
court, by letter setting forth the citations. An original 
letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme 
Court. An original letter and seven copies shall be 
filed in the Court of Appeals. There shall be a refer-
ence either to the page of the brief or to a point ar-
gued orally to which the citations pertain, but the 
letter shall without argument state the reasons for 
the supplemental citations. Any response shall be 
made within 7 days of filing and shall be similarly 
limited. 
(k) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs un-
der this rule must be concise, presented with accu-
racy, logically arranged with proper headings and 
free from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or 
scandalous matters. Briefs which are not in compli-
ance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua 
sponte by the court, and the court may assess attor-
ney fees against the offending lawyer. 
(I) Brief covers. The covers of all briefs shall be of 
heavy cover stock and shall comply with Rule 27. 
Rule 25. Brief of an amicus curiae or guardian 
ad litem. 
A brief of an amicus curiae or of a guardian ad 
litem representing a minor who is not a party to the 
appeal may be filed only if accompanied by written 
consent of all parties, or by leave of court granted on 
motion or at the request of the court. A motion for 
leave shall identify the interest of the applicant and 
shall state the reasons why a brief of an amicus 
curiae or the guardian ad litem is desirable. Except 
•;. a UTA 
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alter a verdict »f guilty. an\ other judge of that court 
or any judge assigned by the prosid-.ng office* >r ** « 
Judicial Council may perlorm those duties 
i c If the prosecution or a defendant in anv ciinn 
nal action or proceeding files an affidavit that the 
jud(»* before wh im the action or proceeding is Lo be 
tn*"' .»r heard ' is a mat* or prejudice, either against 
**!>• or hi .ittornev or in favor of anv opposing 
o tht su *, thn judge shall proceed no further 
until the chali*'«ige is disposed of Every affidavit 
shall statue the i.i I s and the reasons for the belief that 
th» l MS or prejudice exists and shall be filed as soon 
> - . cticable after the case has been assigned or the 
prejudio is known No affidavit may be filed 
acromp^' ted bv a certificate of counsel of 
ne Fida\-t ,md appln*aii< r ire m.Hie in 
t. . . :ht ^ i f h 
enter an order directing ? hat a 
tified to another named judge ot u., ..«. • i< cum t ur 01 a 
court of like jurisdiction, which judge shall then pass 
upon the legal sufficiency of the allegations. If the 
challenged judge does not question the legal suffi-
ciency of the affidavit, or if the ' >m the 
affidavit is certified finds that i ***< f 
another judge shall be called t 
conduct the proceeding. If the ju< 
davit is certified does not find tne allidav be 
legally sufficient, he shall enter a finding to that ef-
fect and the challenged judge shall pr< ^ * « • ! • t i n -
case or proceeding. 
(e) (i) If the prosecution or a defendant in a crimi-
nal action believes that a fair and impartial trial 
cannot be had in the jurisdiction where the ac-
tion is pending, either may, by motion, supported 
by an affidavit setting forth facts, ask to have the 
trial of the case transferred to another jurisdic-
tion. 
(ii) If the court is satisfied that the representa-
tions made in the affidavit are true and justify 
transfer of the case, the court shall enter an order 
for the removal of the case to the court of another 
jurisdiction free from the objection and all 
MIN M, I'KorK.nHKE 1 \> 
records pertaining to the case shall be trans-
ferred forthwith to the court in the other county. 
If the court is not satisfied that the representa-
tions so made justify transfer of the case, the 
court shall either enter an order denying the 
transfer or order a formal hearing in court; to 
resolve the matter and receive further evidence 
with respect to the alleged prejudice. 
(f) When a change of judge or place of tna : is « r-
dered all documents of record concerning the ca.-e 
shall be transferred without delay to the juch't- who 
shall hear the case. 
Rule 30. Errors and defects. 
(a) Any error, defect, irregularity or variance 
which does not affect the substantial rights of a party 
| shall be disregarded. . 
yv) Clerical imsuiiies m juugmeiits, uruers ur uuier 
parts of the record and errors in the record arising 
from oversight or omission mav be corrected by the 
• ourt at any time and afirr -un, noli; • if any, as the 
. ourt may order. 
Rule .J; KuU-> i-~ * -MM* 
District ci-i ;-T:
 tijid circuit courts ma\ make local 
rules for the • <»nd»ji-t of criminal proceedings not in-
come-lent with these rules and statutes of the state. 
Copico of all rules made by a court shall, upon pro-
mulgation, be furnished to the Supreme Court and to 
the Judicial Council and shall be made available to 
members of the state bar and the public Circun 
courts promulgating rules shall send copies thereof 1 
the district court having appellate jurisdiction 
If no procedure is specifically prescribed b\ T 1 * 
the court may proceed in any lawful manner r <•* in 
consistent with these rules or «-*at'it/>,. 
Rule 32. Minute en t ry . 
The case file shall include copies of all minute en-
tries of proceedings and orders made in that case. 
ilnU- : t Kr£uiiHioi • -miuet - WH « -*r* 
room, 
fhe ourt ma> make appi'uprj.i^ or.v-- regti-.i. ».'.* 
the conduct of officers, parties, spectators and ^ .* 
nesses prior to and during the conduct of anv pm< *-**o 
ing. 
